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ABSTRACT 
 
3DUWLHV·SDUOLDPHQWDU\GHOHJDWLRQVFRQWDLQDPXOWLWXGHRI LQWHUHVWV:KLOHVFKRODUVVXVSHFW WKDW this 
variation affects party behavior, most work RQ SDUWLHV· SROLF\ VWDWHPHQWV treats parties as unitary 
actors. This reflects the absence of strong expectations concerning when (and how) the 
parliamentary caucus matters for platform construction, as well as the difficulties inherent in testing 
such claims. Drawing on the literature on ZRPHQ·V descriptive representation, we argue that the 
makeup of the parliamentary party likely has important consequences for issue entrepreneurship, the 
scope of issues represented on the manifesto, and even the left-right position of election platforms. 
With the most comprehensive party-level study RIZRPHQ·VUHSUHsentation ever conducted, we test 
our three diversity hypotheses XVLQJGDWDRQWKHJHQGHUPDNHXSRISDUWLHV·SDUOLDPHQWDU\GHOHJDWLRQV
and the content of their manifestos for 110 parties in 20 democracies between 1952 and 2011. We 
show that as the percentage of women in the parliamentary party increases, parties address a greater 
GLYHUVLW\RILVVXHVLQWKHLUHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQV:RPHQ·VSUHVHQFHLVDOVRDVVRFLDWHGZLWKPRUHOHIW-
OHDQLQJ PDQLIHVWRV HYHQ ZKHQ FRQWUROOLQJ IRU SDUWLHV· SULRU ideological positions. Together, these 
findings illustrate a previously overlooked consequence of descriptive representation and provide a 
framework for understanding when and why the parliamentary party influences manifesto 
formation. They show that diversity³or lack thereof³has important consequences for SDUWLHV·
policy statements, and thus the overall quality of representation.  
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: political parties; intra-party politics; women and politics; party manifestos; election 
campaigns 
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 Parties bring together a multitude of interests within a single organization. Politicians 
represent a range of electoral districts, possess distinct backgrounds and personal characteristics, and 
hold a broad set of issue priorities and preferences (e.g Esaiasson 2000; Narud and Valen 200; 
Norton 1999; Thomassen and Andeweg 2004). Members of parliament, moreover, believe that these 
unique perspectives have implications for the form and content of political representation. They 
argue that changing the membership of the parliamentary delegation alters SDUWLHV· policy agendas. 
These claims are especially prevalent in the debates surrounding efforts to bolster the presence of 
historically underrepresented groups in elected office. Arguments in favor of increasing women·V
numeric (or descriptive) representation, for example, suggest that doing so will bring new 
experiences, viewpoints, and topics into the policy formation process (e.g. Kittilson 2008, 2010).   
While politicians claim that the makeup of the parliamentary delegation matters for the 
quality of representation, scholars remain divided on this front. On the one hand, a large body of 
normative literature argues that the election of women and minorities facilitates the policy 
representation of group interests (e.g. Mansbridge 1999; Williams 2000; Young 2002). These claims 
find support in empirical studies linking descriptive and substantive representation (Kittilson 2008, 
2010; Xydias 2007). The effect of iQGLYLGXDO03V·preferences in parliamentary systems, on the other 
hand, has been of comparatively little interest to party politics researchers. Although scholars 
suspect that intra-party variation shapes partLHV· behavior (e.g. Bernauer and Brनuninger 2009; Ceron 
2012 and 2013; Debus and Brनuninger 2008; Greene and Haber 2014; Greene and Jensen 2014; 
Schumacher et al. 2013), existing studies have yet to generate strong theoretical or empirical 
expectations about SDUOLDPHQWDULDQV·UROH on this front. To the contrary, most work treats parties as 
unitary actors and ascribes policy shifts to electoral motivations (e.g. Adams et al. 2006; Adams and 
Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow 2008; Ezrow et al. 2011; Hellwig 2012; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Tavits 
2007; Williams et al. 2014).  
  
3 
Drawing on wide-ranging normative and empirical literatures³which rarely speak to one 
another³we help to resolve these seemingly contradictory claims by explicitly linking the makeup of 
the parliamentary party to election platform formation. As the public face of their parties, we 
recognize that MPs shape platforms by offering new ideas and providing parties with the credibility 
necessary to attend to particular issues. Though this influence has proved exceptionally difficult to 
observe, we argue that when parties include a broader and more diverse set of viewpoints within the 
parliamentary delegation, this likely influences their willingness to campaign on new issues and to 
emphasize a greater range of topics on their election platforms. The composition of the 
parliamentary caucus may even DIIHFWWKHSDUW\·Vleft-right position.  
To test for these diversity effects, we focus on the relationship between ZRPHQ·V
representation and the content of election platforms in 110 parliamentary parties from 20 OECD 
countries between 1952 and 2011. Examining the impact of wRPHQ·V GHVFULSWLYH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
offers an ideal test for our theory. A large normative and empirical literature posits that women 
bring distinct preferences and perspectives to the policymaking process. These claims, moreover, are 
central to DFDGHPLFDQG´UHDOZRUOGµdebates concerning measures like gender quotas for candidate 
lists. Evidence that gender composition influences the content of SDUWLHV· policy statements would 
thus provide insights into the importance of diversity within parliamentary delegations, while also 
adding to our knowledge of the effects of descriptive representation on policy change. 
With our original and expansive dataset, we consider the likelihood that a party 1) innovates 
on a topic not previously politicized in the country, 2) presents a broader set of issues on its 
platform, and 3) shifts its left-right position. We show that organizations with more female MPs 
present more topically diverse platforms and move their positions leftwards. In demonstrating that 
the makeup of the parliamentary delegation can broaden (or narrow) the content and scope of the 
manifesto, we shed light on a neglected factor influencing platform construction. We also draw 
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attention to an overlooked by-product RI LQFUHDVLQJ ZRPHQ·V presence in elected office. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that diversity³or lack thereof³has important consequences for 
the overall quality of representation.  
In the following sections, we first identify two accounts RISDUOLDPHQWDULDQV·UROHVLQVKDSLQJ
party behavior. We then bring together and extend this literature with three hypotheses linking 
parliamentary party diversity and election platform construction. We test these claims by examining 
the relationship between the presence of female MPs and issue entrepreneurship, platform breadth, 
and the left-ULJKWSRVLWLRQRISDUWLHV· agendas. We provide consistent evidence that the proportion of 
seats held by women has VWURQJ LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU SDUWLHV· FDPSDLJQ PHVVDJHV. Based on these 
findings, we FRQFOXGHE\GLVFXVVLQJZRPHQ·V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ and intra-party diversity as a missing 
link explaining policy change. 
 
COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON PARTY BEHAVIOR  
Parties are the primary political actors in modern democracies. Party policy change is thus of major 
interest to those concerned with questions of democratic representation and accountability in these 
states, and a large body of work examines the factors shaping their policy statements. Parties have 
been shown, for example, to alter their left-right stances in response to shifts in public opinion 
(Adams et al. 2009). The magnitude of party change is influenced by previous electoral 
performances (Somer-Topcu 2009), and the degree of responsiveness further varies based on party 
type (Adams et al. 2006; Adams and Ezrow 2009; Ezrow et al. 2011; Spoon 2011), inter-party 
competition (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009, Meguid 2008), intra-party dynamics (Ceron 2012 and 
2013; Schumacher et al. 2013) and economic circumstances (Adams et al. 2009; Greene 2015; 
Hellwig 2012; Williams et al. 2014). 
Between elections, parties alter not only their left-right location, but also the issues on which 
they focus. Though voters punish parties that change their positions on principled matters, parties 
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can adjust their stances on more pragmatic policies (Tavits 2007). When they expect to benefit from 
campaigning on novel topics, parties also act as issue entrepreneurs (De Vries and Hobolt 2012). 
They focus on particular policies³such as ´JUHHQµ FRQFHUQV³based on electoral threat and 
opportunity (Spoon et al. 2013). Just as parties address different kinds of topics, the diversity of 
subjects included on their platforms also varies. Changes in the dispersion RI YRWHUV· ideological 
preferences accompany comparable shifWV LQ SDUWLHV· policy positions, particularly in less 
proportional electoral systems (Ezrow 2007).   
7RJHWKHU WKHVH ZRUNV WHOO XV D JUHDW GHDO DERXW SDUWLHV· SROLF\ DJHQGDV /LNH traditional 
theories of election strategy (e.g. Downs 1957; Petrocik 1996), however, they assume that parties 
EHKDYHDVXQLWDU\DFWRUV'HVSLWHWKLVDVVXPSWLRQ·VSUHYDOHQFHSDUWLHVFOHDUO\FRQWDLQGLVWLQFWJURXSV
that do not necessarily share the same interests, concerns, and aims. Growing evidence shows that 
intra-party blocs influence party decision-making and constrain leaders (Ceron 2012, 2013; Wiliarty 
2013). Divisions within parties shaped institutional reforms in Japan (McElwain 2008), for example, 
and moderated broad party changes and coalition politics across Europe (Gianetti and Benoit 2008; 
Harmel and Janda 1994; Laver 1999). Internal divisions over policy strategy likewise dominate the 
campaigns of small parties (Spoon 2011). More generally, the balance-of-power between intra-party 
groups affects parties· responses to vote- and office-seeking incentives (Schumacher et al. 2013). 
Existing research thus offers competing narratives: there is reason to treat parties as unitary 
actors, but growing evidence also shows that intra-party dynamics influence party behavior. This 
work remains comparatively silent, moreover, on the link between the composition of intra-party 
JURXSV DQG SDUWLHV· SROLF\ VWDWHPHQWV 7KHUH KDV EHHQ OLWWOH WKHRUL]LQJ LQ SDUWLFXODU RQ WKH
relationship between the makeup of the parliamentary party and the election manifesto. This is a 
VXUSULVLQJRYHUVLJKWJLYHQDFWLYLVWV·DQGSROLWLFLDQV·EHOLHIVWKDWWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIVRFLDOLGHQWLWLHV
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and territorial and functional interests within the parliamentary delegation matters for policy 
outcomes, as well as the direct and indirect roles MPs play in the agenda formation process.  
The principal barrier in reconciling these perspectives is not the belief that either electoral 
motivations or the parliamentary delegation alone wholly explain party behavior; scholars accept the 
importance of both. Rather, the challenge is that it is unclear when³and in what ways³the makeup 
of the parliamentary party influences platform construction and how we can test for these effects. A 
solution to these challenges lies, we argue, in incorporating research on the representation of 
historically underrepresented groups into the party politics framework.  
Arguments in favor of increasing the presence of traditionally marginalized groups in elected 
office often highlight the unique viewpoints held by group members (e.g. Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 
1995; Williams 2000). These works posit that group representatives call on elements of their shared 
experiences with their constituents to explore possible ramifications of emergent issues and speak 
with authority on these matters. This suggests that the inclusion of these groups in the parliamentary 
party has observable implications for the form and content of parWLHV·SROLF\VWDWHPHQWV Inspired by 
this literature, in the following section we theorize about SDUOLDPHQWDULDQV· UROH LQ DJHQGD
construction and develop three hypotheses connecting the makeup of the parliamentary delegation 
to manifesto formation. To do so, we focus on an increasingly important marker of political 
diversity: the gender composition of the parliamentary party. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF DIVERSE PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES  
Despite the large literature on party manifestos, little systematic research considers their authorship. 
This largely reflects the tremendous variation in the procedures governing policy construction both 
across parties and within parties over time. Even during a single election, differences can emerge 
between the formal rules and informal norms governing platform creation. Like other intra-party 
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affairs, party agenda formation is treated as a black box from which unified policy statements 
emerge. 
Though manifesto authorship is understudied, there is reason to believe that 
parliamentarians play direct and indirect roles in this process. Among intra-party groups, 
parliamentarians disproportionately influence policy (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Esaiasson 
2000; Patzelt 1997, 1999; Thomassen and Andeweg 2004). In fact, policy positions often emerge 
from intense debates within parliamentary party groups (Diaz 2005; Thomassen and Andeweg 
2004). 3DUWLHV·LQWHUQDOGLYLVLRQRIODERUIXUWKHUVWUHQJWKHQVSDUOLDPHQWDULDQV·SRVLWLRQV7KRPDVVHQ
and Andeweg 2004). By accumulating specialized knowledge, rank-and-file MPs become leaders in 
particular fields and exercise considerable influence over party policy (Patzelt 1999; Searing 1994).  
Consistent with this work, members of the parliamentary delegation often directly participate 
LQ SROLF\ FRQVWUXFWLRQ &RQVLGHU IRU H[DPSOH WKH %ULWLVK JRYHUQLQJ SDUWLHV·  HOHFWLRQ
PDQLIHVWRV 7KH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\·VSROLF\ FRPPLVVLRQV LQFOXGHG ILJXUHV IURP WKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\
parW\·V&RPPLWWHHDQG03VIURPWKH1XPEHU3ROLF\%RDUG,QGHHG WKLV ODWWHUERG\ZDV
established to incorporate parliamentarians· viewpoints into government policy. The Number 10 
Policy Unit also featured several MPs. Parliamentarians likewise aided in the construction of the 
/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWV·PDQLIHVWRMPs ZHUHLPSRUWDQWILJXUHVRQWKHSDUW\·VFHQWUDOSROLF\PDNLQJERG\
the Federal Policy Committee (FPC), and within its Manifesto Working Group. The FPC also 
consulted with the parliamentary party³aVZHOODVWKHSDUW\·VSROLF\ZRUNLQJJURXSVZKLFKLQFOXGH
MPs³before finalizing the platform·V content.   
In addition to direct involvement, MPs also indirectly affect party policy. In many ways, 
parliamentarians are the lifeblood of they party: they interact with constituents, serve on policy-
oriented committees, campaign on its behalf, etc.  Even when the leader and her closest advisers 
play an outsized role in manifesto authorship, rules and norms provide MPs with the access 
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necessary to lobby ministers and articulate distinct viewpoints (Norton 1999; Thomassen and 
Andeweg 2004). Leaders, in turn, have incentives to address SDUOLDPHQWDULDQV· SROLF\ LGHDV In 
parliamentary systems, governing parties depend on 03V· loyalty to control the executive. MPs 
similarly play a role in intra-SDUW\OHDGHUVKLSFRQWHVWVDQGLQIOXHQFHWKHOHDGHU·VWHQXUHLQRIILFH 
LHJLVODWRUV· FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DUH thus OLNHO\ ´LPSRUWDQW FRPSRQHQWV RI WKH LQSXW IRU
parliamentary decision-PDNLQJµ &RWWD DQG %HVW   ,QGHHG WKH composition of the 
parliamentary delegation has already been shown to influence the issues parties include on their 
platforms (Kittilson 2010). Yet, establishing which 03V· characteristics matter³and in what ways 
the makeup of the parliamentary party influences manifestos³remains a significant challenge.  
While rarely considered by party politics scholars, a large body of women and politics 
research suggests that the gender composition of the parliamentary delegation provides a promising 
point of departure for this work. Sex is an increasingly salient political identity; parties from across 
the ideological spectrum address women on their policy statements, court female voters, and even 
implement quota policies mandating the selection of female candidates based on the belief that 
women have unique political SHUVSHFWLYHV:RPHQ·VGHVFULSWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWKXVUHSUHVHQWVDNH\
area in which scholars and politicians alike believe that the composition of the parliamentary 
delegation affects party behavior. Unlike other groups, moreover, women are present across 
countries and DPRQJ DOO SDUWLHV· VXSSRUWHUV. This allows for the examination of GLYHUVLW\·V HIIHFWV
across place and time. Using sex as an important marker of diversity, we focus on three ways in 
ZKLFKZRPHQ·VSUHVHQFHLQWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\SDUW\OLNHO\LQIOXHQFHVSODWIRUPFRQVWUXFWLRQ 
 
Issue Entrepreneurship  
Historical competencies, government participation, and public opinion each influence the 
issues parties include on their agendas (Spoon and Klüver 2014; Klüver and Spoon Forthcoming). 
Parties typically focus on issues important to their traditional constituencies and on which they are 
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perceived as capable (Hibbs 1977; Petrocik 1996; Egan 2013). Electoral dynamics also play a role, as 
competition from new, issue-focused parties encourages mainstream organizations to address new 
policies (Meguid 2008; Spoon et al. 2013). In certain contexts, parties also use formerly neglected 
topics to seek out previously unmobilized supporters (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Acting as ´issue 
entrepreneurs,µ they hope to benefit from campaigning on a new issue dimension on which party 
and voter preferences align (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Schumacher et al. 2013).  
Though previously overlooked, we posit that the parliamentary party can also play a role in 
issue entrepreneurship. Intra-party diversity may help parties identify latent topics and provide them 
with the motivation to address these subjects on their policy agendas. These effects are especially 
likely to emerge when members of the parliamentary caucus have distinct outlooks that they 
articulate during the policy formation process. In many institutions, female politicians in particular 
have been shown to offer unique viewpoints. Male and female parliamentarians sometimes express 
personal interests in different policy areas and address different issues in electoral campaigns 
(Wängnerud 2000). Female candidates in Westminster democracies, for example, have distinct 
attitudes concerning representation, economic conservatism, and social and moral traditionalism 
(Erikson 1997, Norris 1996). In Nordic states, (wo)men in parliament hold policy views similar to 
(wo)men in the electorate (Narud and Valen 2000). Even where men and women have broadly 
similar attitudes, male and female co-partisans FRQFHLYHRI´ZRPHQ·V LQWHUHVWVµGLIIHUHQWly (Xydias 
2013) and have significantly different preferences with respect to affirmative action and gender 
equality (Lovenduski and Norris 2003; McAllister and Studlar 1992).  
While there is no single ´ZRPHQ·V perspective,µ and not all female MPs differ from their 
male counterparts, in the aggregate male and female politicians have often been shown to both take 
different stances on the same issues and also to prioritize different policy areas. Though largely 
empirically untested, normative theorists further suggest that alternative perspectives are likely to be 
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especially iPSRUWDQWZKHQ DGGUHVVLQJ ´XQFU\VWDOOL]HG LQWHUHVWVµ 0DQVEULGJH ,Q WKHVH FDVHV
representatives of traditionally marginalized groups call on elements of their shared experiences with 
their constituents to explore the ramifications of emergent issues and speak with the authority of 
experience on these matters. Increasing parliamentary party diversity may thus increase the 
probability that at least a subset of MPs can use their distinct worldviews to draw attention to new 
topics (including, but not limited to, those traditionally viewed as ´ZRPHQ·VLVVXHVµ). Indeed, while 
descriptive representation does not necessarily alter policy outcomes, its effects are most likely to be 
felt in the agenda-setting phase of the policymaking process (Barnes 2016, Franceschet and Piscopo 
2008, Kittilson 2010). 
Even when female politicians neither perceive that they hold unique perspectives and 
priorities nor enter office with the intention of advocating on behalf of new policies (Bochel and 
Bochel 2008), their presence alone can reduce barriers to issue entrepreneurship. Risk adverse 
leaders avoid topics on which they have little previous experience. Greater parliamentary party 
diversity provides leaders with information that both highlights previously unidentified issues and 
reduces the uncertainty of addressing new topics. This suggests:  
H1: Parties with a greater percentage of female MPs are more likely to act as issue 
entrepreneurs by including previously unaddressed topics on their policy platforms.  
Issue Breadth  
Parliamentary party diversity also likely affects the breadth of SDUWLHV· statements. 
7KHRUHWLFDOO\LISDUWLHVKHOGSHUIHFWLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIYRWHUV·LVVXHSULRULWLHVWKH\
could address only those topics on which they would attract more votes than their competitors (De 
Vries and Hobolt 2012). In practice, though the number of ideological dimensions in Western 
Europe decreased in the post-war era (Best 2011; Stoll 2010), WKHEUHDGWKRISDUWLHV· DJHQGDVKDV
generally increased over time (Greene 2015). Parties now aim to satisfy a broad range of objectives 
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with the issues included on their manifestos. They hope to emphasize areas in which they are 
competent (e.g. Green and Jennings 2012), influence the scope of the election (Hellwig 2012; 
Wagner and Meyer 2014; Williams et al. 2014), indicate their desired cabinet portfolios (Bäck et al. 
2011), and outline the policies they intend to pursue in office (Jennings et al. 2011; Thomson 2001). 
Extending the logic of the first hypothesis, we argue that intra-party diversity provides 
incentives for including a wider range of issues on the manifesto. The inclusion of previously 
unidentified issues does not demand that parties remove other topics from their platforms. To the 
contrary, parties will continue to address these issues to appease voters and party members. 
Logically, the inclusion of both existing and emerging topics necessarily broadens the scope of 
SDUWLHV·PDQLIHVWRV. Even in the absence of issue entrepreneurship, the wider range of perspectives 
provided by a more diverse parliamentary party likely expands OHDGHUV·DWWHQWLRQWRDEURDGHUVHWRI
issues. Indeed, if the party hopes to convert parliamentary delegation diversity into increased vote-
share, it may feel obligated to reflect this diversity in its platform. In these cases, parties should 
provide a more extensive (and thus inclusive) manifesto to voters. Consequently, we expect:    
H2: Parties with a greater percentage of female MPs discuss a greater number of issues on 
their policy platforms. 
 
Left-Right Positions 
 Parties vary not only the content and scope of their platforms, but also their overall 
placement on the left-ULJKWVSHFWUXP,QGHHGWKHPDMRULW\RIUHVHDUFKRQSDUWLHV·PDQLIHVWRVIRFXVHV
on these left-right shifts. Studies show that parties alter their stances in response to public opinion 
(Adams et. al 2009), the economy (Hellwig 2012; Williams et al. 2014), recent and significant losses 
(Harmel and Janda 1994) FRPSHWLWRUV· SRVLWLRQV (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Meguid 2008; 
Somer-Topcu 2009), and their own experiences in government (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012).  
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Though this work treats parties as unitary actors, a growing body of evidence suggests that 
intra-party relations influence these shifts. Leaders balance the goals of competing intra-party groups 
vis-à-vis pursuing pure policies versus winning office (Spoon 2011). Intra-party elections and 
decision-making bodies DOVR OLPLW OHDGHUV· DELOLW\ to unilaterally set policy priorities and election 
strategies (Ceron 2012; Greene and Haber 2014; Harmel and Janda 1994; Lehrer 2012). The relative 
strength of party activists and leaders, for example, determines the degree to which parties respond 
to vote- and office-seeking aims (Greene and Jensen 2014; Schumacher et al. 2013). Internal factions 
HYHQOLPLWOHDGHUV·DELOLW\WR maintain parliamentary discipline (Ceron 2013).  
While it is clear that intra-party dynamics affect agendas, the parliamentary GHOHJDWLRQ·V role 
in shaping LWV SDUW\·V placement on the left-right dimension remains unknown. Building on the 
previous hypotheses, we expect that diversity has both direct and indirect consequences on this 
front. Diversifying the parliamentary delegation can lead to the incorporation of perspectives that 
diverge from WKHSDUW\·VSUHVHQWposition. Female parliamentarians in Western Europe, for example, 
tend to be to the left of both their male colleagues and male and female voters (Diaz 2005). This 
pattern holds for parties across the political spectrum. On average social democratic women are 
more likely than their male co-partisans to prioritize left-leaning social policy issues (Wängnerud 
2000), just as female Conservative MPs are more likely than men to adopt progressive, feminist, and 
left-leaning positions (Childs and Webb 2012). The inclusion of women in the parliamentary 
delegation may thus move the party leftward.     
(YHQLIPDOHDQGIHPDOHSDUOLDPHQWDULDQVYLHZWKHPVHOYHVDVLGHRORJLFDOO\VLPLODUZRPHQ·V
presence may indirectly lead parties to present more left-leaning manifesWRV )HPDOH SROLWLFLDQV·
preferences on gender equality policies tend to be to the left of their male colleagues (Lovenduski 
and Norris 2003; McAllister and Studlar 1992), and they are more likely to articulate these claims 
during parliamentary party group meetings (Erzeel 2015). This focus on more left-leaning issues is 
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not restricted to explicitly gendered issues; in some cases female candidates are also more concerned 
about welfare services, poverty, and healthcare (Norris 1996). 8QVXUSULVLQJO\ZRPHQ·Vpresence in 
SDUOLDPHQWFRUUHODWHVZLWKJRYHUQPHQWV·LQFUHDVHGIRFXVRQVRPHOHIW-leaning policy areas (Annesley 
et al. Forthcoming; Kittilson 2008). 
,IUHVSRQGLQJWRZRPHQ·VGLVWLQFWLVVXHSULRULWLHVOHDGVSDUWLHVeither to begin addressing left-
leaning issues³or to move their positions on existing policies slightly to the left³then diversity will 
generate a leftward shift in their overall positions. In her study of parties' manifestos, for instance, 
Kittilson (2010) finds that parties with more female representatives place greater emphasis on social 
justice issues. A heightened focus on these policies should, in turn, pull parties to the left in the 
aggregate. We thus posit that diversity within the parliamentary delegation has knock-on effects for 
WKHSODWIRUPV·SODFHPHnt on the left-right dimension. This suggests our final hypothesis:   
H3: Parties with a greater percentage of female MPs will shift their ideological positions 
leftward. 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
 We test our hypotheses by combining data on the gender composition and election 
manifestos of 110 parties in 20 OECD countries between 1952 and 2011.1 Our original dataset of 
                                                          
1 Our sample is primarily limited by the availability of data on the gender makeup of the 
parliamentary party. We include parties in the following countries: Australia (1969-2010), Austria 
(1971-2008), Belgium (1995-1999), Canada (1972-2011), Denmark (1968-2011), Finland (1966-
2011), Germany (1972-2009), Greece (2004), Ireland (1969-2011), Japan (1967-2005), Luxembourg 
(1979-1999), Netherlands (1971-2010), New Zealand (1972-2011), Norway (1965-2005), Portugal 
(1979-2011), Spain (1979-2011), Sweden (1970-2010), Switzerland (1995-2011), the United Kingdom 
(1974-2010), and the United States (1952-2008). 
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899 total observations includes the broadest set of parties and countries for which data could be 
located. It represents the most comprehensive party-level study RI ZRPHQ·V UHSUHsentation ever 
conducted. 
As well as being unparalleled in their scope, our data also provide a difficult test for our 
theory in two important ways. First, mandate switching is comparatively less common in these 
countries than in other parts of the world (Thomson et al. 2012). Since parties usually implement 
their agendas when controlling office, they are likely to be selective about the policies included on 
their platforms. Second, while our sample includes a diverse set of parties and countries with a wide 
range of institutional rules, on average party unity is high and party leaders maintain strong control 
of the legislative agenda. These are the very circumstances in which ZH PLJKW H[SHFW ZRPHQ·V
presence to have the least effect on policy platforms. Consequently, evidence for our hypotheses in 
these countries increases our confidence that our results will hold in systems where parties are less 
cohesive and legislators have greater freedom to initiate policy.   
 
Outcome Variables: Operationalizing Issue Entrepreneurship, Breadth, and Left-Right 
Position  
7RH[DPLQHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQZRPHQ·VGHVFULSWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGSDUWLHV·SROLF\
statements, we use Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) data (Budge et al. 1998; Klingemann et 
al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2011) to develop three outcome variables directly related to our hypotheses. 
The CMP measures the percentage of statements parties include on their manifestos in 56 different 
policy arenas, which we collapse into 42 non-directional issues (Greene 2015). When examining 
issue entrepreneurship, ZHIRFXVRQWKHILUVWGLPHQVLRQRIGH9ULHVDQG+REROW·VGHILQLWLRQ
emphasizing the ´SDUW\ VWUDWHJ\RIDFWLYHmobilization of new policy issues that have been largely 
LJQRUHGE\ WKHSROLWLFDOPDLQVWUHDPµ 250). To capture this phenomenon, we created an indicator 
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variable that denotes whether the party was the first in the country to address a new policy domain.2 This is a 
conservative measure of issue entrepreneurship that focuses on major policy innovations in one of 
our 42 distinct domains, such as human rights, education and social justice.3 According to our data, 
for example, the German Free Democratic Party introduced the anti-imperialism topic into the 
electoral arena for the first time in 1976. Prior to that election, no other German manifesto included 
this issue area³which captures negative references to ´imperial EHKDYLRUµ (Volkens et al. 2011).  
To capture issue diversity, we examine WKHVFRSHRISDUWLHV·policy statements (Greene 2015). 
In particular, we consider the number of issues that parties include in their election manifestos. 
Focusing again on the 42 CMP policy areas, we calculate WKH UHODWLYHQXPEHURI LVVXHV LQSDUWLHV·
platforms with a PHDVXUHRIHQWURS\FRPPRQO\XVHGWRVWXG\SROLWLFDOWH[WV6KDQQRQ·V+Jennings 
et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 8VLQJ6KDQQRQ·V+ZHHVWLPDWHWKHGHJUHHRIIUDFWLRQDOL]DWLRQLQ
SDUWLHV·platforms and then convert this entropy measure into an indicator of the effective number of 
manifesto issues (ENMI).4  
                                                          
2 See appendix for details concerning each outcome variable.  
3 The nature of CMP coding means that our measure of issue entrepreneurship captures large 
innovations, but not subtle breakthroughs within these policy areas (in pay equity, parental leave, 
and childcare, for example). As discussed below, this biases our findings towards a null result. At the 
same time, while the categories are broad, the &03V· common framework makes it the best available 
data for studying issue entrepreneurship across a wide set of organizations over time. 
4 It is important to note that the measures of both entrepreneurship and scope focus not on 
´ZRPHQ·VLVVXHVµLQSDUWLFXODUEXWRQWKHVHWRILVVXHVLQFOXGHGLQWKH&03FRGLQJVFKHPHPRUH
broadly.  
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Finally, RXUWKLUGRXWFRPHYDULDEOHIRFXVHVRQSDUWLHV· left-right policy positions on a set of 
common policy dimensions. Following other studies, we use /RZHHWDO·Vlogit scale to gauge 
left-right shifts. We opt for this measure because it better accounts for the salience-based nature of 
the data. With the logit scale, one additional left comment does not have the same effect on the left-
right position of a party that has already made a large number of left statements as it does for a party 
that has not made any left-leaning claims.5  We label the left-right position as RILE. 
The Explanatory Variable: Operationalizing Diversity  
We posit that diverse parliamentary delegations result in diverse agendas. As a proxy for diversity, 
the primary explanatory variable is the SHUFHQWDJHRIVHDWVKHOGE\ZRPHQLQWKHSDUW\·VSDUOLDPHQWDU\FDXFXV6 
As party platforms are written prior to the election, this variable is lagged. For the 2005 British 
manifestos, for example, data on the percentage of female MPs in the three major parties is taken 
from the 2001 general election results. Though information on the total percentage of legislative 
seats held by women is readily available, no preexisting source reports the gender composition of 
SDUWLHV· SDUOLDPHQWDU\ GHOHJDWLRQs over the full period of our study. Relying primarily on 
parliamentary websites and archives, we assembled an original dataset on ZRPHQ·VLQFOXVLRQDPRQJ 
SDUWLHV· 03V LQ  democracies. While there is a great deal of variation in ZRPHQ·V GHVFULSWLYH
representation among the parties in our sample, on average female parliamentarians hold only 20 
percent of seats.  
 
                                                          
5 In robustness checks using the original RILE score, the effect of gender diversity on left-right 
shifts is not statistically significant.  
6 We undertake a series of analyses using alternate transformations of the primary independent 
variable, including the squared percentage, a cubic polynomial, and the natural log. The results from 
these models are consistent with those reported. 
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Control Variables 
Building on previous studies, we include a number of party- and country-level variables 
aimed at controlling for omitted variable bias (see appendix for details). At the party-level, we 
include predictors capturing incumbent status, FKDQJH LQ WKH SDUW\·V HOHFWRUDO VXFFHVV LQ WKH ODVW
election (Harmel and Janda 1994), and relative ideological distance from the country-level mean 
party preference (Lowe et al. 2011). These factors have been shown to DIIHFWSDUWLHV·SODWIRUPV and 
may also influence their propensity to select female candidates. We also include an indicator variable 
denoting whether the party leader is female. Leaders are important actors in manifesto construction, 
and parties with more female MPs are more likely to be female-led 2·%ULHQ  2·%ULHQ DQG
Rickne Forthcoming). This covariate thus accounts for the possibility of an intervening relationship.7 
Finally, at the country level we control for majoritarian election rules and the effective number of 
electoral parties.8 This accounts for the possibility that the electoral system shapes ERWKZRPHQ·V
GHVFULSWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGSDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVRYHUSUHVHQWLQJPRUHRUOHVVGLYHUVHDJHQGDV 
 
Modeling Strategy 
To examine the relationship between party composition and 1) issue entrepreneurship, 2) 
issue breadth, DQGPDQLIHVWRV·OHIW-right location, we fit three models with party-level fixed effects. 
                                                          
7 As a sensitivity analysis, we include a measure of parties· organizational structures similar to 
Schumacher et al. (2013). Despite our expectations, the findings suggest little effects due to party 
organization, though future analyses with more dynamic measures may demonstrate clearer results. 
Analyses controlling for the rise of internet campaigning in the 2000s indicate results similar to those 
presented in the main models (see appendix for details). 
8 We exclude the majoritarian election dummy variable for the issue entrepreneurship model in the 
main analysis due to its extremely high correlation with the fixed effects.  
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These models account for idiosyncratic party-level behavior that may influence platform diversity. 
Model 1 uses binomial logistic regression to predict issue emergence. Model 2 and Model 3 are 
ordinary least squares regression models predicting ENMI and RILE. All models include a lagged 
dependent variable to account for autocorrelation. The lagged outcome variable also helps to control 
for the theoretical expectation that the diversity and ideological location of the previous policy 
statement may be significant predictors of the form and content of the current manifesto. Dickey-
Fuller tests indicate that panels in most countries are stationary. Sensitivity analyses largely confirm 
that the results are robust to the time-series specification of the outcome variables.9  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
As shown in Table 1, the results largely support our theoretical framework. The level of 
diversity in the parliamentary party clearly shapes SDUWLHV·election manifestos. Even accounting for a 
                                                          
9 We present the fixed effects models with lagged dependent variables to account for cross-sectional 
variation and temporal autocorrelation, while allowing us to deal with highly unbalanced panel data 
in which the number of panels (parties) exceeds the number of time points (elections). Although the 
structure of the data potentially allows the dependent variable to be autoregressive, Dickey-Fuller 
tests assure us that at least one panel is stationary in the sample for each dependent variable when a 
single lag is included and that most countries include at least one stationary series (95% confidence 
or higher). To account for potential issues caused by the few non-stationary series, in the Appendix 
we present additional time series robustness checks using Mixed Effects, Vector Autoregressive 
Error Correction, and Equilibrium Response models. We also fit the issue entrepreneurship model 
using Firth·s penalized likelihood approach and the ENMI and RILE models with country- and 
party-level random effects. The results from these analyses are largely similar to the results presented 
in the main analysis.  
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litany of other party- and country-level factors, parties with more female parliamentarians author 
agendas that are broader in scope and present more left-leaning manifestos. They are not, however, 
more likely to act as issue entrepreneurs. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that parties with more female parliamentarians will be 
more likely to include new topics on their manifestos. The coefficient estimate for the covariate 
capturing the percentage of female MPs in Model 1, however, is non-significant. Parties in which 
women hold more seats are no more likely to include new issues on their platforms than those with 
less diversity among their parliamentary delegates. This suggests that diversity does not necessarily 
lead parties to innovate in broad topic areas that have not previously been politicized in the country. 
While women may highlight new issues within these arenas³such as childcare provisions and 
maternity leave under the umbrella of welfare state expansion³in the aggregate their presence is not 
associated with large-scale entrepreneurship. At the same time, it is worth noting that none of the 
well-established variables explaining party behavior predict issue emergence. Future work is needed 
to understand both the circumstances in which diversity leads to issue entrepreneurship within 
policy subcategories, as well as to identify the mechanisms driving this phenomenon more generally.   
 Our second hypothesis (H2) posits that parties with more women in their parliamentary 
delegations will be more likely to include a greater set of issues on their election manifestos. Unlike 
before, we find strong support for this claim. The coefficient estimate for the percentage of female 
MPs in Model 2 is positive and significant (at the Į=0.05 level). When the proportion of seats held 
by female MPs is larger, parties increase the diversity of issues referenced on their manifestos. We 
demonstrate this relationship in Figure 1, which plots predicted ENMI values against ZRPHQ·V
descriptive representation. Comparing one standard deviation below and above the mean level of 
gender diversity increases the ENMI measure by 1.27 (95% CI: 0.47, 2.07). This is an increase of 
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approximately 4.4% over the range of ENMI, a change that corresponds to the inclusion of nearly 
one full additional topic on the party manifesto (holding all other variables constant).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
The results in Model 3 support our third hypothesis. We theorized that greater diversity has 
ERWKGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWHIIHFWVRQSDUWLHV·LGHRORJLFDOVWDQFHVIn particular, the more women in the 
parliamentary delegation, the more likely a party should be to shift its position leftwards. That is, 
ZRPHQ·V GHVFULSWLYH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ is expected to be QHJDWLYHO\ FRUUHODWHG ZLWK WKH SDUW\·V 5,/(
score. As posited, HYHQZKHQFRQWUROOLQJIRUWKHSDUW\·VSUHYLRXVLGHRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQthe coefficient 
for the percentage of female MPs is negative and significant (at the Į=0.01 level). Figure 2 
GHPRQVWUDWHV WKH HIIHFW RI JHQGHU GLYHUVLW\ RQ SDUWLHV· 5,/( scores. Moving from one standard 
deviation below to one above the mean level of gender diversity leads to a -0.20 change on this left-
right measure (95% CI: -0.28,-0.13). This corresponds to a 5 percent decrease over the range of the 
RILE score.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Finally, our results are even more striking when viewed alongside our control variables. The 
models in Table 1 suggest that the presence of a female leader results in a more diverse agenda, 
though the effect size is smaller than the coefficient capturing women's presence in the 
parliamentary delegation. Female leaders have no effect, moreover, on parties· left-right positions. 
The selection of a new type of leader may thus facilitate the inclusion of new ideas, but is unlikely to 
generate fundamental shifts in SDUWLHV· ideological locations.  
Majoritarian systems likewise increase ENMI and are also associated with more left-leaning 
manifestos than proportional systems. By encouraging candidate-centered appeals (e.g. Carey and 
Shugart 1995), these electoral rules incentivize parties to include more issues on their manifestos. 
Incumbent parties are also slightly more leftward than opposition parties, all else equal. When in 
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government, parties are often forced to respond to policy change on a range of issues in order to 
avoid appearing irresponsible or unaccountable. Often these issues require more active government 
support, and defending these actions within the manifesto leads to leftward shifts. The remaining 
control variables have no effect on issue entrepreneurship, platform scope, or the left-right position 
of the manifesto. Accounting for other factors and party-level fixed effects, change in vote-share, 
ideological distance, and the effective number of parties fail to predict any of our three outcome 
variables. Indeed, the proportion of female MPs better explains the diversity of parties' policy 
statements than these key characteristics.  
We have theorized and demonstrated a new way in which the inclusion of group 
representatives matters for policy formation. Just as female MPs sometimes hold distinct preferences 
and priorities, their presence also leads parties to advance more topically diverse agendas. While 
existing work often focuses on the link between descriptive and substantive representation, our 
ILQGLQJV LQGLFDWH WKDW LQWHJUDWLQJ ZRPHQ·V viewpoints KDV EURDGHU HIIHFWV RQ SDUWLHV· manifestos. 
Irrespective of whether ZRPHQ·V presence results in the adoption of policy explicitly related to 
women, it likely has wider³and previously overlooked³consequences for the policymaking 
process.  
These results, in turn, have important implications for research on agenda formation and the 
study of the effects of descriptive representation. While previous work on party manifestos 
RYHUORRNHG WKH PDNHXS RI WKH SDUOLDPHQWDU\ GHOHJDWLRQ ZH VKRZ WKDW 03V· FKDUDFWHULVtics help 
explain changes in party policy, including the left-right location of the platform and its scope. By 
IRFXVLQJRQGLYHUVLW\JHQHUDOO\DQGZRPHQ·VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQSDUWLFXODUZHoffer a framework for 
understanding when and why the parliamentary delegation influences manifesto formation.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper integrates the parliamentary delegation into the agenda formation process. We 
argue that the makeup of the parliamentary caucus influences the election manifesto, particularly 
when parliamentarians hold distinctive viewpoints and give voice to these perspectives. 
Consequently, we posited that parties with more diverse delegations are likely to campaign on new 
issues, emphasize a broader range of topics on their electoral platforms, and even adjust their left-
right positions.  
8VLQJ ZRPHQ·V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ DV D PHDVXUH RI GLYHUVLWy, we conducted the most 
comprehensive party-level study RIZRPHQ·VUHSUHsentation to date, examining 899 party manifestos 
from 20 countries in elections held between 1952 and 2011. Although our sample represents a 
difficult test for our theory, the results from our analysis support two of our three hypotheses. As 
the percentage of female MPs increases, parties address a wider scope of issues in their election 
campaigns. WRPHQ·V SUHVHQFH is also associated with more left-leaning manifestos, even when 
FRQWUROOLQJ IRU SDUWLHV· prior ideological positions. While we do not find support for our issue 
entrepreneurship hypothesis, moreover, we believe that this remains a promising area for future 
research. Altogether, oXU UHVXOWV VXJJHVW WKDW ZRPHQ·V GHVFULSWLYH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ SDUWLHV·
delegations shifts SDUWLHV·policy statements. These findings have important implications for studies 
of party politics, as well as for empirical and normative research on descriptive representation.  
For party scholars, our work helps to unpack the black box of intra-party politics and sheds 
new light on the policymaking process. To date, it has been difficult to develop and test clear 
expectations concerning why (and in what ways) intra-SDUW\ YDULDWLRQ LV OLNHO\ WR LPSDFW SDUWLHV·
manifestos. We demonstrate that (lack of) diversity among elected representatives is likely to have 
broad consequences for campaign messages. While this analysis focuses on women·s representation, 
we expect that this relationship holds for other traditionally underrepresented groups, as well as for 
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interests that are not based on ascriptive identity. That is, we believe that the scope and content of 
issues presented to the public, and thus the very nature of representative claims, often depend on 
the makeup of the parliamentary delegation. Future work should not overlook this important 
explanatory factor when studying party agenda construction and change.  
These findings hold similar importance for those interested in the broader implications of 
descriptive representation. We show that bolstering diversity within the parliamentary party has 
implications for the policy agenda beyond increasing attention to historically marginalized groups. 
While a large body of work examines whether IHPDOH03VSODFH´ZRPHQ·VLVVXHVµRQWKHDJHQGD
we find that they broaden the scope of the platform and generate more attention to leftist issues. 
These results lend support to a key³but as of yet largely untested³assumption underpinning 
normative arguments in favor of ZRPHQ·V representation. Importantly, they also suggest that the 
exclusion of historically marginalized groups not only inhibits the substantive representation of 
group interests, but may also result in parties presenting narrower platforms to the public. By 
EURDGHQLQJ WKH SDUW\·V IRFXV GLYHUVLW\ arguably improves the quality of representation for all 
citizens. 
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Diverse Parties, Diverse Agendas?  Female Politicians and the 
3DUOLDPHQWDU\3DUW\·V5ROHLQ3ODWIRUP Formation 
 
APPENDIX  
 
In this Appendix, we offer additional information in support of the main arguments presented in 
the text. In particular, we present the measurement of one of the key dependent variables 
(ENMI), as well as the descriptive statistics for the primary variables. Furthermore, we present 
the results from a number of statistical robustness checks that provide supplementary evidence 
for our theory linking diverse parties and diverse agendas.   
 
MEASURING ENMI 
 
Following Jost (2006) and Greene (2015)1 we use the formula below to construct the ENMI 
(effective number of manifesto issues) measure. In equation (1), mi represents the percentage of 
the manifesto³as measured by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)³dedicated to issue i 
for each of the 42 issue categories2 used by the CMP coders.3 :HH[SRQHQWLDWH6KDQQRQ·V+WR
transform the variable from a measure of entropy to a measure of diversity. Mathematical 
diversity is thus a characteristic of a set of groups that summarizes both the number of categories 
(policy areas) and the relative distribution of the population (manifesto quasi-sentences) across 
those categories.  
 
In equation (3), we provide an example of our measure in action. For a hypothetical manifesto 
with only two quasi-sentences addressing two separate issues³that is, 50% of overall attention 
to each issue area³ENMI equals 2.  If the party added a third sentence addressing an additional 
topic, ENMI would increase to 3.4 A theoretical party distributing its issue attention (quasi-
sentences) equally across all 42 categories would have the maximum possible ENMI of 42.   
                                                          
1 Nyblade (2004) and Stoll (2011) perform a similar modification to the Herfindahl index to 
arrive at their measures of the effective number of issues. The Herfindahl index, however, is 
biased towards the most dominant categories. In this way, it is an indicator of the largest 
FDWHJRULHV· UHODWLYH GRPLQDQFH UDWKHU WKDQ D ´WUXHµ measure of entropy like 6KDQQRQ·V +
(Shannon 1948; Jost 2006).   
2 Following Lowe et al. (2011), we collapse the natural confrontational pairs contained in the 
CMP so that we avoid over-counting any of these distinct topics. In particular, we combine 
categories on  ´)RUHLJQ 6SHFLDO 5HODWLRQVKLSV SRVLWLYHµ DQG ´)RUHLJQ 6SHFLDO 5HODWLRQVKLSV
QHJDWLYHµ  ´0LOLWDU\ SRVLWLYHµ DQG ´0LOLWDU\ QHJDWLYHµ  ´,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVP SRVLWLYHµ DQG
´,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVPQHJDWLYHµ´(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\SRVLWLYHµDQG´(XURSHDQ Community: 
QHJDWLYHµ  ´&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP SRVLWLYHµ DQG ´&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP QHJDWLYHµ 
´'HFHQWUDOLVDWLRQµ DQG ´&HQWUDOLVDWLRQµ  ´3URWHFWLRQLVP 3RVLWLYHµ DQG ´3URWHFWLRQLVP
QHJDWLYHµ  ´:HOIDUH 6WDWH ([SDQVLRQµ DQG ´:HOIDUH 6WDWH /LPLWDWLRQµ  ´(GXFDWLRQ
([SDQVLRQµ DQG ´(GXFDWLRQ /LPLWDWLRQµ  ´1DWLRQDO :D\ RI /LIH SRVLWLYHµ DQG ´1DWLRQDO
:D\RI/LIHQHJDWLYHµ´7UDGLWLRQDO0RUDOLW\SRVLWLYHµDQG´7UDGLWLRQDO0RUDOLW\QHJDWLYHµ
´0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVPSRVLWLYHµDQG´0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVPQHJDWLYHµ´/DERXU*URXSVSRVLWLYHµ
DQG´/DERXU*URXSVQHJDWLYHµDQGODVWO\´.H\QHVLDQ'HPDQG0DQDJHPHQW3RVLWLYHµDQG
´(FRQRPLF2UWKRGR[\3RVLWLYHµ  By collapsing these categories we decrease the total number 
of possible issue topics from 56 to 42.   
3 Following Jennings et al. (2011), we replace ln(0) with zero. 
4 1RWH WKDW RXU PHDVXUH DUULYHV DW LGHQWLFDO VFRUHV DV /DDNVR DQG 7DDJHSHUD·V (1979) formula 
when the distribution of issues is equal in each category.  Otherwise, their measure tends to 
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
Table 1 provides descriptions of the outcome and explanatory variables.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min Max N 
Iss. Entrep. 0.0423 0.201 0 1 899 
ENMI 16.78 5.579 1 29.82 899 
RILE -0.548 0.604 -2.753 1.309 892 
% Female MPs 0.194 0.163 0 1 899 
Female Leader 0.115 0.319 0 1 899 
Incumbent 0.400 0.490 0 1 899 
Ideol. Distancet-1 0.329 0.269 0.00108 1.632 899 
% Votet-1 21.06 15.08 0.280 57.71 899 
Majoritarian 0.189 0.392 0 1 899 
ENEPt-1 4.188 1.395 1.966 9.587 899 
Federalism 0.306 0.461 0 1 899 
 
Table 1 highlights differences amongst the three dependent variables. In particular, the sample 
includes substantial variation in ENMI and RILE scores, though few examples of issue 
entrepreneurship. On the whole, like other studies of party policy change, we believe these 
measures provide important information about the dynamics of election campaigns and future 
policy change (e.g. de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Greene 2015; Lowe et al. 2011). 
 
In contrast to the variation in ENMI and RILE scores, examples of issue entrepreneurship are 
less common. Parties rarely act as issue entrepreneurs in the sample, reflecting the conservative 
nature of our measure. An issue can only be included as a novel contribution in a country the 
first time it is discussed. This limits the total hypothetical number of issue emergence 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
indicate slightly less diversity (smaller numbers) as the Herfindahl index over counts the size of 
the largest categories (Jost 2006). 
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opportunities for any country to 42 (the total number of issue categories used once explicitly 
directional issues are collapsed). Parties thus only act as entrepreneurs in 4.2% of cases.  
 
The relatively broad issue categories included in the CMP also limits the extent to which 
innovation can be identified using this data. From a substantive standpoint, this measure cannot 
capture nuanced differences in the discussion of specific policies, such as childcare and maternity 
leave, as both are captured by Issue Code 504-´:HOIDUH6WDWH([SDQVLRQµ,QGHHGWKLVLVQRWD
QHZSUREOHPDV.LWWLOVRQGLVFXVVHVWKHEURDGQDWXUHRIWKH&03·VSROLF\FRGHV$VVKH
concludes, however, the CMP provides the most comprehensive indicator of issue salience at the 
party level available for a wide range of advanced democracies over time.  
 
Unlike issue entrepreneurship, Table 1 shows significant variation in ENMI. While increased 
attention to issues such as childcare and maternity leave is unlikely to register as issue emergence, 
moreover, it would likely affect this policy scope measure. Overall, parties with no female MPs 
have an ENMI of 15 on average while parties with any female MPs increase to 16.7. Focusing on 
welfare policies (codes 504 and 505) in particular, parties with any women in their parliamentary 
delegations dedicate 1.5% more attention to the welfare state than those without female MPs. 
More broadly, ENMI has increased over time in most countries. This reflects the addition of 
new, post-materialist issues³like environmental concerns³to the policy agenda. Consistent 
with Greene (2015), niche parties (e.g. green parties) include fewer issues (13.1) on average than 
mainstream social democratic (16.9) and conservative (16.5) parties. For additional discussion of 
(10,·VYDOLGLW\VHH1\EODGHDQG*UHHQH6WROOOLNHZLVHSURYLGHVDPHDVXUH
of ideological dimensionality based on similar principles.   
 
Finally, the measure of left-right preferences in the CMP has seen substantial use in the study of 
party positions (e.g. Adams et al. 2006; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; de Vries and Hobolt 
(]URZ0HJXLG:DJQHU/RZHHWDO·VORJJHGVFDOHDFFRXQWVIRU
the diminishing effect of sWDWHPHQWV RQ WKH SDUW\·V OHIW-right position, although it means that 
there is no natural center position. On average, social democratic parties (-.74) are more left 
leaning (negative) than conservative parties (-.23). In general, the left-right scale provides us with 
DUHDVRQDEOHLQGLFDWRURISDUWLHV·UHODWLYHSRVLWLRQVRQDEURDGHFRQRPLFSROLF\GLPHQVLRQ 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In the article, we note the possibility of potential confounding factors due to the cross-sectional 
time series structure of the data. Although Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that most countries 
include stationary panels, non-stationary processes in some panels may generate biased results. 
We account for these processes using two alternate techniques that transform the data into 
stationary processes: Error Correction Models and Equilibrium Response Models. The results 
from these analyses are largely consistent with those in the main text and provide interesting 
information about the relationship between the primary independent variable and party platform 
change. 
 
Error Correction and Event History Models 
 
In Table A1, we present the results of an error correction model for ENMI and RILE. We also 
estimate an event history model of issue entrepreneurship with clustered standard errors on 
party.5 We treat issue entrepreneurship as a discrete event history model where we include a 
                                                          
5 The results in Model A1 include a linear trend, which is positive and significant (at the Į=0.05 
level). Alternative specifications that include other transformations of time since the last 
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count for the number of elections since the last time the party acted as an entrepreneur. By 
fitting error correction models6 and an event history model for issue entrepreneurship, we 
decrease the risk of autocorrelation driving the results by producing stationary series. 
   
The results in Table A1 provide evidence that parallels the results presented in the main text. In 
Model A1, we predict whether long- or short-term levels of gender diversity influence the 
likelihood of acting as an issue entrepreneur. The coefficients for both variables are negative, in 
contrast to the prediction from the first hypothesis. There is little evidence that the percentage of 
female MPs influences parties·SURSHQVLW\WR introduce a brand new issue that has never before 
been discussed in the state. 
 
Model A2 in Table A1 demonstrates evidence in support of the second hypothesis. The 
coefficients for both the long- and short-term effects are both positive and the short-term effect 
is statistically different from zero at the Į=0.1 level. The short term effect is also substantively 
meaningful. Controlling for all other covariates, parties in which women increase their seat share 
by 10% increase their ENMI by 0.3 as compared to parties that maintain a stable percentage of 
female MPs. Gender diversity thus has a short-WHUP HIIHFW RQ WKH VFRSH RI SDUWLHV· SROLF\
statements. 
 
Table A1 also provides support for the third hypothesis. Parties with greater diversity in their 
parliamentary caucuses are further to the left than their less diverse counterparts. The 
FRHIILFLHQWV IRU ERWK YDULDEOHV FDSWXULQJ ZRPHQ·V GHVFULSWLYH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ DUH QHJDWLYH DQG
statistically significant. Consistent with our theoretical approach, this suggests that increasing 
gender diversity leads parties to move to the left both in the short- and long-term. 
 
Equilibrium Response Models 
 
An alternate approach based on McDonald and Best (2006) involves directly estimating each 
SDQHO·VHTXLOLEULXPOHYHORIWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH+HUHDVDQH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOH the model 
includes WKH SDQHO·V VDPSOH PHDQ YDOXH RI WKH GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH 7KLV DFFRXQWV IRU WKH
equilibrium reversion value of this dependent variable.  To account for past changes to the 
equilibrium level, the model also includes a measure of the equilibrium variable minus the lagged 
value of the dependent variable (t-1). Here, the equilibrium variable should be equal to one. The 
lagged difference captures the speed with which deviations return to equilibrium values.  
 
We present the results from this approach in Table A2.  These findings are broadly consistent 
with the previous analysis. In particular, we find additional support for the second hypothesis. As 
the lagged percentage of female MPs increases, ENMI also increases. The coefficient is large and 
statistically significant at the Į=0.1 level.  A 10% increase in female MP diversity is associated to 
a 0.23 increase in ENMI. The coefficient for the equilibrium and lagged dependent variable 
further suggest that the magnitude of this change would take multiple elections to return to 
equilibrium. 
 
The evidence for the third hypothesis in Table A2 is also strong. The coefficient for gender 
diversity is negative and statistically different from zero. These results should be cautiously 
interpreted on their own, however, as McDonald and Best (2006) indicate that a coefficient value 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
entrepreneurship event³including logged, inverted, exponentiated, and cubic polynomials³lead 
to nearly identical results with respect to both substantive magnitude and statistical significance.  
6 Error correction models include panel corrected standard errors accounting for panel specific 
AR1 processes.  
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overly large or small (i.e. not equal to 1) for the equilibrium variable suggests that the equilibrium 
model does not perform particularly well.  
 
Together these results are broadly consistent with our findings.  Although we found limited 
evidence of non-stationarity in most panels, the results from models accounting for 
autoregressive tendencies largely corroborate of our theory of diversity and platform formation. 
 
)LUWK·V3HQDOL]HG/LNHOLKRRG$SSURDFK 
 
Issue entrepreneurship can be considered a rare event, with only 34 instances in the dataset. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ZHHVWLPDWHG WKHPRGHOXVLQJ)LUWK·VSHQDOL]HG OLNHOLKRRGDSSURDFK D FRPPRQ
strategy for dealing with rare events (Table A3). As before, the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and the proportion of female MPs remains non-significant.  
 
Random Effects Models 
 
The paper presents the results from our fixed effects models. In order to account for the 
covariance between parties across elections and within a given country, the data was also 
analyzed using varying-intercepts random effects models (Table A4). We use country- and party-
level grouping variables, such that the hierarchical structure of our data consists of party-
elections nested within 110 parties and 20 countries. The results are consistent with the findings 
presented in the paper, although the variable drops just below significance in the issue diversity 
model.  
 
Party organization 
 
3DUWLHV· RUJDQL]DWLRQDO VWUXFWXUH SOD\V DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ WKHLU GHFLVLRQ-making (e.g. 
Schumacher et al. 2013). Although our theoretical mechanism suggests that MP diversity directs 
party policy change due to credible suggest new ideas and slight differences in their policy 
interests, the degree to which party leaders dominate the manifesto writing process might also 
PDWWHU  7R DFFRXQW IRU WKLV DUJXPHQW ZH LQFOXGH D YDULDEOH WR DFFRXQW IRU WKH SDUW\·V
organizational hierarchy similar to Schumacher et al. (2013) based on expert evaluations of 
SDUWLHV·RUJDQL]DWLRQV7 Despite its limiting our sample substantially in terms of country and party 
scope, the inclusion of this variable in Table A5 provides additional evidence for our theory. 
 
Web 2.0 
 
&KDQJLQJPHDQVRIFDPSDLJQFRPPXQLFDWLRQVOLNHO\KDVKDGUHDOLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSDUWLHV·SROLF\
messages. Studies of electronic media suggest that they largely reflect similar substance as more 
traditional campaign media (Gibson 2012), but the usage of online social media might also have 
an effect on issue diversity and policy positions. To account for this potential we run the analysis 
including a dummy variable to account for the emergence of campaigning in the Web 2.0 era that 
equals 1 for all elections starting in 2000. Table A6 indicates that the inclusion of this control 
variable leads to substantively similar results to those presented in the main analysis.  
                                                          
7 The constitutive term is dropped from the models due to the inclusion of fixed effects and the 
lack of variance in the leadership control variable. 
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Table A1. Event History and Error Correction Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Issue Entrep. ENMI RILE 
main    
ǻ)HPDOH03V -0.195 2.903+ -0.390** 
 (1.002) (1.582) (0.133) 
% Female MPst-1 -0.160 0.358 -0.182
+ 
 (0.646) (1.155) (0.094) 
ǻ)HPDOH/HDGHU -0.161 0.708 0.039 
 (0.399) (0.501) (0.049) 
Female Leadert-1 -0.125 0.228 -0.076 
 (0.295) (0.438) (0.053) 
ǻIncumbent Party t-1 -0.222 0.077 -0.037 
 (0.169) (0.297) (0.029) 
Incumbentt-1 0.225 -0.458 0.016 
 (0.243) (0.365) (0.036) 
ǻ,GHRO'LVWDQFHt-1 -0.222 0.507 0.053 
 (0.372) (0.615) (0.060) 
Ideol. Distancet-2 -0.356 1.139 0.063 
 (0.460) (0.745) (0.057) 
ǻ9RWH 0.003 0.048 -0.007* 
 (0.016) (0.031) (0.003) 
% Votet-1 0.005 0.033
* -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.001) 
Majoritarian 0.273 0.058 -0.019 
 (0.211) (0.541) (0.036) 
ǻ(1(3t-1 -0.469** -0.906** -0.026 
 (0.146) (0.343) (0.028) 
ENEPt-2 -0.187
+ -0.406** -0.001 
 (0.100) (0.149) (0.016) 
Niche Party 0.538* -0.589 -0.084** 
 (0.267) (0.402) (0.030) 
Lagged DV -0.095 -0.433*** -0.233*** 
 (0.432) (0.062) (0.054) 
Constant -1.396* 7.702*** -0.072 
 (0.584) (1.273) (0.086) 
Time 0.010   
 (0.017)   
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
 3.948 0.374 
Ȥ2 69.328 90.984 62.116 
N 775 775 768 
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Table A2. Equilibrium Models 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) 
 ENMI RILE 
% Female MPst-1 2.296
* -0.301** 
 (1.012) (0.094) 
Female Leadert-1 0.079 -0.021 
 (0.487) (0.045) 
Incumbentt-1 -0.401 0.029 
 (0.307) (0.028) 
Ideol. Distancet-2 -0.544 0.025 
 (0.553) (0.051) 
% Votet-1 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.012) (0.001) 
Majoritarian 0.522 -0.056 
 (0.403) (0.038) 
ENEPt-2 0.015 -0.021
+ 
 (0.133) (0.012) 
Niche Party -0.131 -0.022 
 (0.425) (0.039) 
Lagged DV 0.109** 0.186*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) 
DV Varying 
Equilibrium 
0.977*** 1.080*** 
(0.037) (0.029) 
Constant 0.217 0.158* 
 (0.960) (0.066) 
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
3.784 0.348 
N 775 768 
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Table A3. Logistic Regression with Firth's Correction 
 (1) 
 Issue Entrep. 
  
% Female MPs -0.374 
 (1.401) 
Female Leadert-1 -0.161 
 (0.710) 
Incumbent -0.226 
 (0.374) 
Ideol. Distance -0.669 
 (0.718) 
% Votet-1 0.010 
 (0.013) 
ENEPt-1 -0.482
* 
 (0.214) 
Lagged DV -0.074 
 (0.317) 
Constant -1.125 
 (0.922) 
Log-Likelihood -136.701 
Ȥ2 15.099 
Observations 899 
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Table A4. Random Effects Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Issue Entrep. ENMI RILE 
    
% Female MPs -0.330 1.437 -0.452*** 
 (1.398) (1.107) (0.110) 
Female Leadert-1 -0.357 0.375 0.027 
 (0.780) (0.507) (0.049) 
Incumbent -0.240 -0.003 -0.042 
 (0.381) (0.328) (0.031) 
Ideol. Distancet-1 -0.783 0.287 0.039 
 (0.727) (0.571) (0.056) 
% Vote 0.011 0.058** -0.004+ 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.002) 
Majoritarian 0.072 1.270+ -0.138 
 (0.417) (0.691) (0.088) 
ENEP -0.487* -0.046 -0.041* 
 (0.220) (0.157) (0.018) 
Lagged DV 0.224 0.364*** 0.359*** 
 (0.561) (0.032) (0.032) 
Constant -1.173 9.125*** -0.038 
 (0.959) (1.032) (0.108) 
Party-Level Std. Dev. 
 
-14.217 0.350 -1.422 
 (455099.377) (48.267) (11.895) 
Country-Level Std. Dev. 
 
-13.795 0.350 -1.422 
 (298383.562) (48.267) (11.895) 
Random Effect Constant  1.379*** -1.021*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) 
Ȥ2 16.960 184.683 185.543 
Observations 899 899 892 
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Table A5. Models Controlling for Organizational Structure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Issue Entrep. ENMI RILE 
    
% Female MPs -0.805 5.868** -0.539** 
 (3.050) (2.189) (0.204) 
% Female MPs X 
Leader Hierarchy 
-11.882+ -1.692 -0.519 
 (7.029) (4.306) (0.401) 
Female Leadert-1 -0.285 1.050 -0.071 
 (1.210) (0.803) (0.075) 
Incumbent -0.276 -0.229 -0.110** 
 (0.574) (0.455) (0.042) 
Ideol. Distancet-1 1.830 -0.335 0.194
* 
 (1.133) (0.914) (0.085) 
% Vote 0.036 0.004 0.001 
 (0.069) (0.048) (0.004) 
Majoritarian  5.118** -0.543*** 
  (1.615) (0.150) 
ENEP -0.211 0.367 -0.030 
 (0.649) (0.421) (0.039) 
Lagged DV -15.515 0.076 0.143** 
 (1314.190) (0.050) (0.052) 
Constant  11.193*** 0.025 
  (2.340) (0.210) 
Log-Likelihood -40.889 -1142.270 -152.800 
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
 3.949 0.368 
Ȥ2 11.498   
Observations 208 417 417 
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Table A6. Models Controlling for Web 2.0 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Issue Entrep. ENMI RILE 
    
% Female MPs -0.698 2.935* -0.254+ 
 (2.465) (1.448) (0.131) 
Female Leadert-1 -0.973 1.214
* -0.002 
 (1.134) (0.542) (0.049) 
Incumbent -0.355 -0.067 -0.060+ 
 (0.471) (0.340) (0.031) 
Ideol. Distancet-1 -0.076 -0.390 0.065 
 (0.790) (0.625) (0.057) 
% Votet-1 0.066 0.039 -0.004 
 (0.051) (0.032) (0.003) 
Majoritarian  4.370** -0.528*** 
  (1.528) (0.137) 
ENEPt-1 -0.813 -0.040 -0.021 
 (0.503) (0.262) (0.024) 
Web 2.0 0.990+ 0.563 -0.210*** 
 (0.597) (0.396) (0.036) 
Lagged DV -0.698 0.107** 0.146*** 
 (0.574) (0.038) (0.035) 
Constant  12.787*** -0.090 
  (1.620) (0.135) 
Log-Likelihood -82.057 -2429.659 -257.875 
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
 3.876 0.347 
Observations 357 899 892 
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